The Tzaddik and the Rebbe

Why is it permitted to ask a Tzaddik to davven on one’s behalf, but it is not permitted to submit the same request to an angel? The Rebbe explains:

One meshulach (fundraiser), a fool, when given a pidyon (written request for blessing from a Tzaddik) to give to the (Previous) Rebbe, would refuse to take it, saying that one should request from Hashem directly, and not through intermediaries.

The truth is, as explained in the responsum of the Chasam Sofer,[1] ... that there is a difference between angels and [Jewish] souls. Requesting via angels is considered a request via intermediaries (which is forbidden), while the request via souls, who are higher than angels, is not considered a request via intermediaries, for “All Israel are partners, one body and one soul. When one Jew feels pain, his fellow also senses it, and shares his pain. ... Since they are both in pain, it is better for the head to enter (and plead for Heavenly mercy) than for the foot to enter. The Talmidei Chachamim (Torah scholars) are the head.” This is especially true of Jewish leaders (“nesi’ei Yisro’el”) who are the “heads of the thousands of Israel,” the level of the “head.”[2]

Thus, in this case the principle “The prayer of the sick person himself is more effective than the prayer of others for him”[3] is not applicable. This principle is referring to others, while nesi’ei Yisro’el are not others; rather, they are the “heads of the thousands of Israel.” Therefore their prayer is like “the prayer of the sick person himself,” just as the head prays for the foot.

On the contrary, the prayer of the nesi’ei Yisro’el is even more effective than the prayer of the sick person himself,[4] for the Nasi, who is the head, feels the illness more than the foot. The reason for this is twofold:

• the head is higher than the foot, since the intellect resides there;

• the only reason that the foot feels the illness is on account of the sinews that stem from the brain, for all sensation stems only from the brain.

However, all this only applies when the person recognizes that he is a foot, and devotes himself completely to the head—the Rebbe. However, if one thinks that he has a head as well, and comes to the Rebbe in such a state to hand over a pidyon, then it is indeed questionable to employ an intermediary.

To seek the Rebbe’s advice would not be problematic, for one can ask any Jew for advice. In fact, the Talmud relates[5] that Rav studied from a shepherd for twelve months. However, giving a pidyon (without recognizing the Rebbe as one’s head) raises the question of an intermediary.

All those here are surely devoted to the (Previous) Rebbe. Even those whose devotion is lacking (can be considered devoted, for) since their inner self is devoted to the Rebbe, it is sufficient for them to verbally declare that they are devoted to him (in order for their presentation of a pidyon not to be problematic; see also here). This is similar to Maimonides’ explanation concerning the benefit of “forcing him until he says, ‘I want.’”[6] Since his statement “I want” is consistent with his true desire “to be one of (the people of) Israel ... to perform all the Mitzvos.”

There is thus no basis for a question concerning the issue of (submitting a request for blessing to) an intermediary, not even concerning “an intermediary who joins.”

The knowledge that one is only a foot and the Rebbe is the head is also relevant to the manner in which one fulfills the Rebbe’s command:

The Rebbe may issue a command to do something that involves suffering, or even a command to increase in Torah study and prayer in a way that the person must sever himself from eating, drinking, and sleeping. Even when he carries out the command obediently—knowing that he is merely a foot, and as such he must follow the head’s command—the thought might enter his mind that were the Rebbe to know how hard It is for him to do this, the Rebbe would not have commanded him to do it.

This can be answered based on what was said earlier concerning the head and the foot: Not only is the head able to sense better than the foot, as it is higher, but even the foot’s sensation of pain is in fact the sensation of the head. Thus, if there is a separation, G–d forbid, between the foot and the head, the foot will feel no pain. Thus, when the head commands the foot to place the heel into boiling water, the foot must obey immediately, without thinking twice, and the foot must understand—this degree of understanding the foot is “allowed” to have—that the head feels the pain.

Toras Menachem—Hisva’aduyos, Vol. 2, pp. 31-32.

[1] Shut Chasam Sofer, Orach Chaim, 166.

[2] Tanya ch. 2.

[3] Bereishis Rabba 53:14.

[4] Bava Basra 116a.

[5] Sanhedrin 5b.

[6] Mishneh Torah, Laws of Divorce, end ch. 2. When a husband stubbornly refuses to give his wife a get, a certificate of divorce, the Jewish court forces him to do so until he says “I want.” Maimonides explains that since deep down, every Jew truly wishes to obey the Torah, this declaration of willingness is regarded as genuine, and the divorce is valid.

In my own words: Extending a request to Hashem via an intermediary is only problematic if he is indeed a separate entity from the person who submits the request. However, the Tzaddik is a Neshama klalis, a general soul that contains the souls of other Jews, just as the head contains the life of the body. Thus, the Tzaddik is not a separate entity, but an extension of oneself. Put differently, one’s own spiritual self is in fact an extension of the Tzaddik. Thus, just as my head can davven for my foot, so can I ask the Tzaddik to davven for me.

Therefore, not only does the Tzaddik feel my pain, but my pain is the Tzaddik’s very own pain, which he feels even more acutely than I do myself. Conversely, the Tzaddik’s pain is in fact my pain, even if I do not feel it tangibly.

Thus, the Tzaddik is my head regardless of whether I recognize it. However, if I fail to recognize it, or I recognize it on some level but do not devote myself sufficiently to him, and I treat him as a separate entity, then asking him to pray for me is indeed problematic. However, since the person believes in the Tzaddik and, at least deep down, wishes that he could be devoted to him, it may be derived from Halacha that a verbal declaration of his intent is sufficient to reveal his true desire, even if he is yet to bring this true desire to conform with his daily life. His request for blessing is then not problematic, G-d forbid, but on the contrary, it is desirable.

You ask to be mentioned at the gravesite of my father in law, the Rebbe, of blessed memory; I will do as you ask. You write that you have no understanding of this. [To this I respond that] even when you eat, drink, and sleep, you surely do not contemplate first how this affects your body and soul, and you do all this even if you don’t understand how the impact works. The same principle applies here as well.

As for what you write that it [visiting the gravesite of a Tzaddik] appears:

*like speaking to the dead;

*like directing one’s thoughts to a force other than G–d, G–d forbid.

You surely understand on your own that this is not so. For it is accepted [in Torah sources] that Kalev the son of Yefuneh [Sotah 34b], several Tana’im and Amora’im, and Tzaddikim throughout all the generations did so.

Your question can be explained further, albeit in brief: Even when people would come to the [Previous] Rebbe to request a blessing [during his lifetime], they would come to him not on account of the greatness of his body, but on account of the greatness of his soul. The whole idea of death is only possible for the body, since the soul is eternal. This is true of the soul of a Tzaddik in particular, for it has no connection whatsoever to Gehinom, Kaf HaKela [a punishment for the soul after death], etc. [1] The death of the soul of the Tzaddik is termed Histalkus, which means an elevation to a higher level, and he is not called a dead person, G–d forbid, as it is written in the Zohar (3:71) [thus, visiting the Tzaddik’s gravesite does not constitute speaking to the dead].

As for what you write that it appears like directing one’s thoughts to a force other than G–d; in short, this is not so. For the request is that the Tzaddik in his great righteousness plead favorably on behalf of the one requesting the blessing before the King of all kings, the Holy One, blessed be He.

There is a second intention in this regard: Every Chossid and person connected to the Tzaddik is an individual aspect of the soul of the Tzaddik, which is a great gestalt. It [the Tzaddik’s soul] is comparable to the head relative to its individual souls [which are compared to the body], as explained in Tanya chapter two.

Every individual organ receives its sustenance from the soul, and the soul vests itself first in the head and the brain, and from there the vitality is divided up according to the individual needs of each individual organ.

So is it also in the case of a Chossid and a Rebbe: Since the head is healthy and strong, it contains all the vitality of all the individual bodily organs. [Thus,] in order for the individual organ to be healthy, it must be fully connected to the head: The sinews and nerves that join the head with the organs must be open, for then the vitality related to each respective organ will flow to it.

Generally speaking, this is the concept of Hiskashrus, the bond of a Chossid and a Rebbe. Through this the Chossid receives everything that he needs, both materially and spiritually.

Igros Kodesh, Vol. 3, pp. 458-459.

[1] See Zohar 3:21b "זכאה חולקהון דצדיקיא דנשמתהון סלקין לעילא, ולא מתעכבי באתר אחרא, דלא אצטריך."

The Maggid of Kozhnitz teaches that Moshiach personifies the unity of Hashem and the Jewish people:

“The Tzaddik will sprout forth like a date palm.”

Tehillim 92:13

Why does the date palm allude to the Tzaddik? This tells you that just as the date palm appears beautiful, and all its fruit are sweet and good, so is the son of David (Moshiach) pleasant in appearance, and all his deeds are sweet and good before Hashem.

ibid., Medrash Tehillim

Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi said, “The soul of Adam and the soul of Moshiach were created on the first day, as it is written, ‘And the spirit of Elokim is hovering on the face of the water’ (Bereishis 1:2). This is a reference to the spirit of the king Moshiach, as it is written, ‘And the spirit of Hashem will rest upon him (i.e., Moshiach)’ (Yeshayahu 11:2).”

Bereishis Rabba, 8

The Zohar and the sages of truth (i.e., the Kabbalists—Kabbalah is known as “the wisdom of truth”) wrote that the son of David is himself the soul of Adam. Adam is an acronym for Adam, David, Moshiach. Thus, the spirit of Adam is the same as the spirit of Moshiach.

Eitz Yosef

When were the angels created? Rabbi Yochanan said, “On the second day.” Rabbi Chanina said, “On the fifth day.” ... Everyone agrees that nothing was created on the first day, so that people not say that (the angel) Michoel was stretching out on the south end of the sky, (the angel) Gavriel was stretching out on the north end of the sky, and Hashem was measuring out the middle section.”

Bereishis Rabba, 1

If everyone agrees that nothing was created on the first day, how can Rabbi Yehoshua ben Levi assert that “the soul of Moshiach” was created on the first day? Won’t people come and suggest that Moshiach created the world?

The sages said that “the spirit of Elokim” refers to “the spirit of the king Moshiach,” who includes the souls of all of Yisroel. How pleasant is their statement that “Yisroel (the Jewish people) and Hashem are one” (Zohar 3:73a). ... Rather, it is certain that this (Hashem and the soul of Moshiach, which includes all Jewish souls) is a total unity (“achdus gamur”). This matter is well-known from the holy Zohar and (other holy) books.

Yakar MiPaz (Rabbi Yisroel Hopsztajn, the Maggid of Kozhnitz)

In my own words:

Mentioning Moshiach on the first day of the world’s existence does not lead to heretical claims because Moshiach is a Neshama Kelalis, a general soul, which contains all the souls of the Jewish people. Moreover, at their core the Jewish people and Hashem are totally one. The soul of Moshiach thus represents a level of holiness so great that it reveals this essential unity between the Jewish people and Hashem. Only mention of a separate entity such as an angel would lead to heretical challenges, but mention of the soul of Moshiach, a Tzaddik who personifies the utter unity of the Jewish people and Hashem, does not imply any plurality in the divine, G-d forbid, and thus would not prompt such claims.

Comments:

This teaching fits nicely with the explanation of Chassidus Chabad discussed here (and elsewhere) concerning the various verses and rabbinic statements that appear to identify the Tzaddik with Hashem. Chassidus explains that the Tzaddik’s tremendous bittul—complete lack of ego and utter self-effacement to Hashem—enables Hashem to shine openly in the world through him, and this is what is meant by those surprising statements. Moshiach, who will be a very great Tzaddik, will surely possess this quality.

Here the Yakar MiPaz develops this general notion by explaining that Moshiach’s bittul simply reveals the G–dliness that is his inner self—the core oneness of the Jewish people with Hashem. This oneness is especially expressed in Moshiach because he is a Tzaddik who is a Neshama Kelalis, a general soul which contains the souls of all the Jewish people.

It should be noted that only the Tzaddik of the generation is on the level to act as a Neshama Kelalis for all the Jews of the generation. In contrast, Tzaddikim not on this level only act as a “mini-Neshama Kelalis” for their own disciples (see, for instance, this post).

This would seem to add explanation to the Rebbe’s famous statement (Hisva’aduyos 5746, Vol. 1, p. 343 and elsewhere): “The Nasi of the generation is the Moshiach of the generation.” Since Moshiach is a Neshama Kelalis that contains the souls of all the Jewish people, it is specifically the Tzaddik who is a Neshama Kelalis of this kind—viz., the Nasi of the generation—who qualifies as the Moshiach of the generation, the one who will merit to be revealed as Moshiach and actually bring the redemption if Hashem deems the generation worthy.

The Previous Rebbe taught:

Chassidus and Chassidim are a “tree of life.” The tree contains the roots, which are connected to the koach ha’tzome’ach (the potential for plant life found in the earth that sustains the roots), the trunk of the tree, and the branches. The roots and the trunk enable the branches to receive their vitality and produce various fruit.

In the Chassidic tree of life, the Rebbeim are the roots, the trunk is Chassidus, and the branches are Chassidim.

Every Chossid is a branch of the tree of life. The roots and the trunk enable Chassidim, who are the branches, to receive an internally-felt vitality (“chayus pnimi”) to produce fruit. “What are the fruit? Mitzvos (Sotah 46a)”—performing a Mitzvah with an internally-felt vitality.

Sefer HaMa’amarim 5708, p. 262

Comments:

1. This analogy expresses nicely the concept discussed in the HaYom Yom of 24 Sivan, where it is written:

You ask how can you be bound (mekushar) to me when I do not know you personally. ... The true Hiskashrus (bond) is formed by studying Torah. When you study my Ma’amorim, read the Sichos and associate with those dear to me—the Chassidic community and the Temimim—in their studies and farbrengens, and you fulfill my request regarding reciting Tehillim and observing Torah-study times—in this is the Hiskashrus.

It is true that the Previous Rebbe lists several other criteria for establishing Hiskashrus, but the first one is studying Chassidus, about which he says, “The true Hiskashrus is created by studying Torah.” He then lists other things which are also necessary for Hiskashrus; however, 1. they are listed second; and 2. it is not written that those methods create “true Hiskashrus,” only “the Hiskashrus.”

The above analogy (between roots, trunk, and branches and the Rebbeim, Chassidus, and Chassidim respectively) fits nicely with this, for it conveys the concept that the main role of the Rebbeim is to reveal Chassidus, and thus the most crucial way of connecting with them is by studying and internalizing their teachings.

It should be noted that this analogy for the Rebbe-Chossid relationship was specifically said concerning the relationship of the Chabad Rebbeim and their Chassidim. However, this principle may not be relevant to non-Chabad Chassidim, whose relationship with their Rebbeim may not hinge upon in-depth study of the Torah of their Rebbeim, or at least not to this degree. This difference can perhaps also be inferred from the teaching in this post, in which a non-Chabad Rebbe also describes the relationship between the Tzaddik and his followers as one unit—he uses the analogy of the limbs of a body—but does not emphasize the role of the Torah that the Tzaddik teaches as crucial in establishing this bond.

2. As is known, in pnimiyus (the inner aspect) and chitzoniyus (the external aspect) there are many levels. What is pnimiyus compared to a lower level is chitzoniyus when compared to a higher one (see Zohar 1:20a, discussed in Toras Menachem 5711, Vol. 1, p. 208).

For a Chabad Chossid the relationship with the Rebbe and with all of the Rebbeim of Chabad is a very deep one. They are the root of his Neshama. They guide him in reaching the profound intellectual understanding of Hashem’s greatness revealed in Chassidus. But the goal of this relationship is something still deeper: Bringing the Jew to become truly inspired in his avodas Hashem (divine service). This is attained in a far deeper manner through the relationship with the Rebbeim and the study of Chassidus than without it.

This seems to be really another way of expressing the core Chabad idea that the purpose of Haskalah (scholastic achievement in grasping the complex abstract levels of G–dliness explained in Chabad Chassidus) is Avodah (changing one’s middos, character traits, and inspiring one’s actual conduct).

Perhaps this can also be connected with what Chassidus says in several places (for example, in Sefer HaMa’amarim 5671, p. 145 and in Hagahos L’dibbur Ha’maschil Posach Eliyahu 5658, p.11) that the main purpose of a fruit tree is to grow fruit, and therefore the entire tree is named for the fruit that it produces—for example, a fruit tree.

Perhaps the same can be said in this case: The purpose and end-goal, of the Rebbe-Chossid relationship that Hashem established is the fruit—that the Chossid reach true inspiration in his avodas Hashem. This is the main thing.